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Moral Philosophy — Metaethics

The nature, status, and foundations of moral claims

M
moral_realist_mr 22 terms Jul 7, 2025
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Terms 22

1
Metaethics
Study of the nature, status, and foundations of ethical claims; not which acts are right but what 'right' means
2
Moral Realism
Moral facts exist mind-independently; moral claims can be objectively true or false
3
Moral Anti-Realism
No objective moral facts; includes relativism, nihilism, error theory, expressivism
4
Moral Cognitivism
Moral statements express beliefs; can be true or false; realism and error theory are cognitivist
5
Moral Non-Cognitivism
Moral statements don't express beliefs; express attitudes, commands, or prescriptions
6
Emotivism
Ayer, Stevenson: moral claims express emotional attitudes; 'Murder is wrong' = 'Boo murder!'
7
Prescriptivism
Hare: moral statements are universal prescriptions; 'X is good' means 'do X'
8
Expressivism
Moral claims express non-cognitive attitudes; Blackburn's quasi-realism, Gibbard
9
Error Theory
Mackie: moral claims aim to be factual but systematically false; no moral properties exist
10
Argument from Queerness
Mackie: if moral facts existed they'd be metaphysically and epistemically strange; ad hoc
11
Naturalism (ethics)
Moral properties are identical to or reducible to natural properties; naturalistic fallacy objection
12
Naturalistic Fallacy
Moore: cannot define good in natural terms; whatever natural property you pick, its goodness is open question
13
Open Question Argument
Moore: for any natural definition N of good, 'Is N good?' remains open; so good ≠ N
14
Non-Naturalism
Moore: moral properties (goodness) are non-natural; known by moral intuition
15
Cornell Realism
Synthetic naturalism; moral terms pick out natural properties but not by definition; Boyd, Sturgeon
16
Supervenience
Moral properties supervene on natural ones; same natural facts → same moral facts; no change without natural change
17
Particularism
Dancy: no exceptionless moral principles; context determines moral relevance of features
18
Moral Intuitionism
Basic moral truths known by intuition; cannot be reduced to other truths; Ross's prima facie duties
19
Prima Facie Duties
Ross: multiple moral duties (fidelity, beneficence, non-maleficence) that can be overridden in conflict
20
Constructivism (Rawls/Korsgaard)
Moral truths constructed through rational procedures; not discovered; no stance-independent moral facts
21
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
Our moral intuitions are explained by evolution; this undermines their epistemic status
22
Companions in Guilt
Response to anti-realism: if moral facts are problematic, mathematical facts have same problems